Results for “"factor"”
341–350 of 429 articles
Best match · title matches first
The Register
5 years ago
ransomware hospital — both words
"data breach" — exact phrase
malware -android — exclude a word
(apple OR microsoft) patch — either company, plus patch
ransom* — a wildcard match
Searches article titles, summaries, keywords and sources. Filters use publication dates.
341–350 of 429 articles
Best match · title matches first
The Register
CISA advisories
Overview The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Health and Human Services (HHS), U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), and the Department of Transportation (DoT)—hereafter referred to as “the authoring organizations”—are aware of malicious cyber activity targeting industrial refrigeration and cold chain monitoring systems globally. Organizations in the Healthcare and Public Health, Chemical, Food and Agriculture, and Transportation Systems Sectors widely use these systems, including in refrigerated transport services, for automated and remote monitoring of temperatures, continuous temperature logging, defrost cycle management, and energy optimization. The authoring organizations urge owners and operators to defend against this activity by using strong authentication, keeping systems updated, identifying any systems that are accessible from the internet, removing unnecessary remote access, and securing any necessary remote access. Threat The authoring organizations are aware of malicious cyber actors targeting electronic temperature controllers and commercial refrigeration controllers in retail grocery and cold storage facilities. The actors may exploit vulnerabilities or weaknesses in unpatched or internet-accessible controllers to remotely alter settings and force units into continuous heating and defrost cycles, which can cause widespread inventory loss and equipment hazards. Specifically, the actors may exploit these flaws through multiple vectors: Authentication bypass; Arbitrary code injection; and Weak configurations. Upon successful exploitation of the flaws, the actors could achieve the following effects: Change of temperature, which could: Affect the service life of the system; Create a fire hazard; Cause loss of inventory; or Indirectly harm consumers if products are consumed after unsafe storage. Loss of visibility into current temperatures (a denial-of-view condition). Mitigations The authoring organizations urge owners and operators to immediately take the following actions. These mitigations align with the Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals (CPGs), developed by CISA and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The CPGs provide a minimum set of practices and protections that CISA and NIST recommend all organizations implement: Eliminate public internet exposure: Do not expose control system devices and/or systems, particularly controller panels, to the internet [CPG 3.S]. Should remote access be necessary, protect it by using a firewall or edge device and updating it to the latest version to reduce security vulnerabilities. See CISA’s Internet Exposure Reduction Guidance and Defend the Edge: The Critical Importance of Edge Device Security for additional guidance on securing edge devices. Isolate operational technology (OT) devices: Create a dedicated OT virtual local area network (VLAN) to separate OT devices from business networks [CPG 3.I]. Enforce credential security: Change default passwords [CPG 3.A], strengthen passwords, and implement strong password policies [CPG 3.B]. Further, implement phishing-resistant multifactor authentication wherever feasible [CPG 3.F]. Apply patches: Keep device firmware up to date and establish a structured lifecycle management process to identify, retire, and replace legacy devices that are at end of life (EOL) and no longer supported by the manufacturer [CPG 2.A, 2.B]. See CISA’s BOD 26-04: Implementation Guidance for Prioritizing Security Updates Based on Risk and BOD 26-02: Mitigating Risk From End-of-Support Edge Devices for additional guidance. Restrict access: Define and maintain device and IP address allowlisting, limiting access to only those devices and IP addresses authorized to make changes [CPG 3.H]. Have reliable backups: Maintain current backups offsite and offline and test them [CPG 3.O]. Monitor and report: Enable logging [CPG 3.Q] and regularly review logs for unexpected activity. For OT assets where logs are non-standard or not available, collect network traffic and communications between the assets. Review setpoint ranges: Define and maintain reasonable setpoint limits for devices operating downstream of controllers to stay within safe ranges and establish alerting for deviations. Resources The authoring organizations strongly urge industrial refrigeration and cold chain monitoring system owners and operators to secure remote access to their OT systems. To strengthen system security, owners and operators should review the following resources and implement recommended mitigations: CISA: Primary Mitigations to Reduce Cyber Threats to Operational Technology CISA: Defend the Edge: The Critical Importance of Edge Device Security CISA: Internet Exposure Reduction Guidance United Kingdom’s National Cyber Security Centre and Partners: Secure Connectivity Principles for OT Contact Information The authoring organizations recommend U.S. organizations report suspicious or criminal activity related to information provided in this fact sheet: Contact CISA via CISA’s 24/7 Operations Center at contact@cisa.dhs.gov or 1-844-Say-CISA (1-844-729-2472). For more information on reporting a cyber incident, refer to CISA’s Voluntary Cyber Incident Reporting web page. File a claim with FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) or contact your local FBI field office. When available, please include the following information regarding the incident: Date, time, and location of the incident; Type of activity; Number of people affected; Type of equipment used for the activity; and Name of the submitting company or organization, and a designated point of contact. Contact HHS via HHSCyber@hhs.gov or the HHS 24/7 Operations Center at 202-619-7800 for assistance mitigating potential disruptions to the delivery of healthcare resulting from health and medical supply chain impacts. Disclaimer The information in this report is being provided “as is” for informational purposes only. The authoring organizations do not endorse any commercial entity, product, company, or service, including any entities, products, or services linked within this document. Any reference to specific commercial entities, products, processes, or services by service mark, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply endorsement, recommendation, or favor by the authoring organizations.
CISA advisories
View CSAF Summary Hitachi Energy is aware of OS command injection and Dirty Frag vulnerabilities that affect CoreTec product versions listed in this document. Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities could result in impact on confidentiality, integrity and availability of the product. Please refer to the Recommended Immediate Actions for information about the mitigation/remediation. The following versions of Hitachi Energy CoreTec Product are affected: CoreTec5 vers:CoreTec5/<=3.4.0, 5.0.0 (CVE-2026-13162, CVE-2026-43284) CoreTec4 vers:CoreTec4/<=3.4.0 (CVE-2026-13162) CVSS Vendor Equipment v3 8.8 Hitachi Energy CoreTec5 2 Vulnerabilities Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection'), Write-what-where Condition Background Critical Infrastructure Sectors: Energy Countries/Areas Deployed: Worldwide Company Headquarters Location: Switzerland Vulnerabilities Expand All + CVE-2026-13162 An OS command vulnerability exists in CoreTec product that allows authenticated users with certain roles to execute arbitrary system commands with full control over the device. The vulnerability exists in the configuration daemon's time synchronization handler, which is responsible for setting the system timezone. When processing timezone configuration updates, the daemon constructs a shell command by concatenating user-supplied input without any sanitization or validation. Read More 2 Affected Products CoreTec5 versions 3.4.0 and prior Product Status: fixed, known_affected, recommended Remediations Vendor fixUpdate to CoreTec5 version 5.0.0 CoreTec4 versions 3.4.0 and prior Product Status: fixed, known_affected, recommended Remediations Vendor fixUpgrade to CoreTec5 version 5.0.0 MitigationFollow general mitigation factors Additional Metrics Relevant CWE: CWE-78 Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection') CVSS Version Base Score Base Severity Vector String 3.1 7.5 HIGH CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H 4.0 7.7 HIGH CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N View CVE Details CVE-2026-43284 A vulnerability exists in the IPsec ESP subsystem (esp4) of the Linux kernel used in CoreTec5 that allows a local unprivileged user to escalate privileges to root. The flaw exists in how the kernel handles memory pages when processing ESP encrypted network packets. An attacker can craft a packet that causes the kernel to decrypt data directly into memory pages it does not own, including cached copies of privileged operating system binaries. When one of those binaries is executed, the attacker's injected code runs with root privileges. In CoreTec5, the vulnerable ESP component is compiled in kernel as a built-in and is present at boot time allowing a local user to exploit it. Read More 3 Affected Products CoreTec5 versions 3.4.0 and prior Product Status: fixed, known_affected, recommended Remediations Vendor fixUpdate to CoreTec5 version 5.0.0 CoreTec4 versions 3.4.0 and prior Product Status: fixed, known_affected, recommended Remediations CoreTec5 versions 3.4.0 and prior Product Status: fixed, known_affected, recommended Remediations Vendor fixUpdate to CoreTec5 version 5.0.0 Additional Metrics Relevant CWE: CWE-123 Write-what-where Condition CVSS Version Base Score Base Severity Vector String 3.1 8.8 HIGH CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H View CVE Details Acknowledgments Ritesh Kumar Kalle, Subhojeet Mukherjee, Hishamudeen of the Cybersecurity Research group, Hitachi India R&D Center reported these vulnerabilities to CISA. Notice The information in this document is subject to change without notice and should not be construed as a commitment by Hitachi Energy. Hitachi Energy provides no warranty, express or implied, including warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose, for the information contained in this document, and assumes no responsibility for any errors that may appear in this document. In no event shall Hitachi Energy or any of its suppliers be liable for direct, indirect, special, incidental or consequential damages of any nature or kind arising from the use of this document, or from the use of any hardware or software described in this document, even if Hitachi Energy or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such damages. This document and parts hereof must not be reproduced or copied without written permission from Hitachi Energy and the contents hereof must not be imparted to a third party nor used for any unauthorized purpose. All rights to registrations and trademarks reside with their respective owners. Support For additional information and support please contact your product provider or Hitachi Energy service organization. For contact information, see https://www.hitachienergy.com/contact-us/ for Hitachi Energy contact-centers. General Mitigation Factors Recommended security practices and firewall configurations can help protect a process control network from attacks that originate from outside the network. Such practices include that process control systems are physically protected from direct access by unauthorized personnel, have no direct connections to the Internet, and are separated from other networks by means of a firewall system that has a minimal number of ports exposed, and others that have to be evaluated case by case. Process control systems should not be used for Internet surfing, instant messaging, or receiving e-mails. Portable computers and removable storage media should be carefully scanned for viruses before they are connected to a control system. Proper password policies and processes should be followed. Additional information on Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity Best Practices can be found in the Hitachi Energy “Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity Best Practices” Cybersecurity Notification. [1] SSVC SSVCv2/E:N/A:N/2026-10-26T15:17:24Z/ Recommended Practices CISA recommends users take defensive measures to minimize the risk of exploitation of these vulnerabilities. Minimize network exposure for all control system devices and/or systems, ensuring they are not accessible from the internet. Locate control system networks and remote devices behind firewalls and isolating them from business networks. When remote access is required, use more secure methods, such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), recognizing VPNs may have vulnerabilities and should be updated to the most current version available. Also recognize VPN is only as secure as the connected devices. CISA reminds organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk assessment prior to deploying defensive measures. CISA also provides a section for control systems security recommended practices on the ICS webpage on cisa.gov/ics. Several CISA products detailing cyber defense best practices are available for reading and download, including Improving Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies. CISA encourages organizations to implement recommended cybersecurity strategies for proactive defense of ICS assets. Additional mitigation guidance and recommended practices are publicly available on the ICS webpage at cisa.gov/ics in the technical information paper, ICS-TIP-12-146-01B--Targeted Cyber Intrusion Detection and Mitigation Strategies. Organizations observing suspected malicious activity should follow established internal procedures and report findings to CISA for tracking and correlation against other incidents. Advisory Conversion Disclaimer This ICSA is a verbatim republication of Hitachi Energy PSIRT 8DBD000258 from a direct conversion of the vendor's Common Security Advisory Framework (CSAF) advisory. This is republished to CISA's website as a means of increasing visibility and is provided "as-is" for informational purposes only. CISA is not responsible for the editorial or technical accuracy of republished advisories and provides no warranties of any kind regarding any information contained within this advisory. Further, CISA does not endorse any commercial product or service. Please contact Hitachi Energy PSIRT directly for any questions regarding this advisory. Revision History Initial Release Date: 2026-10-27 Date Revision Summary 2026-10-27 1 Initial public release 2026-10-29 2 Initial CISA Republication of Hitachi Energy PSIRT 8DBD000258 advisory Legal Notice and Terms of Use
CISA advisories
View CSAF Summary Hitachi Energy is aware of multiple vulnerabilities that affect the TRO600 series product versions listed in this document. These vulnerabilities can be exploited for remote code execution (RCE) to carry out further attacks and disclosure of sensitive information. Please refer to the Recommended Immediate Actions section for information about the mitigation/remediation. The following versions of Hitachi Energy TRO600 series products are affected: TRO600 vers:TRO600/<=9.2.1.6, vers:TRO600/<=9.1.1.0, 9.2.2.1, 9.1.2.0 (CVE-2026-10756, CVE-2026-106087) CVSS Vendor Equipment v3 7.5 Hitachi Energy TRO600 2 Vulnerabilities Improper Restriction of Communication Channel to Intended Endpoints, Missing Authentication for Critical Function Background Critical Infrastructure Sectors: Energy Countries/Areas Deployed: Worldwide Company Headquarters Location: Switzerland Vulnerabilities Expand All + CVE-2026-10756 TRO600 contains a vulnerability that allows an authenticated attacker to bypass network access restrictions and access services intended to be reachable only from localhost. By leveraging port forwarding, an attacker can interact with locally bound ports and services, resulting in unauthorized access to sensitive functionality and confidential information, and causing availability impact. Read More 1 Affected Product TRO600 version 9.2.1.6 and prior Product Status: fixed, known_affected, recommended Remediations Vendor fixUpdate to version 9.2.2.1 Additional Metrics Relevant CWE: CWE-923 Improper Restriction of Communication Channel to Intended Endpoints CVSS Version Base Score Base Severity Vector String 3.1 7.5 HIGH CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H 4.0 7.7 HIGH CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N View CVE Details CVE-2026-106087 TRO600 contains an arbitrary file read vulnerability. An unauthenticated attacker can exploit this vulnerability to read or download arbitrary files on the affected device, including sensitive configuration files and password data, resulting in the disclosure of sensitive information. Read More 2 Affected Products TRO600 version 9.2.1.6 and prior Product Status: fixed, known_affected, recommended Remediations TRO600 version 9.1.1.0 and prior Product Status: fixed, known_affected, recommended Remediations Vendor fixFixed in version 9.1.2.0. Update to the latest version 9.2.2.1. Additional Metrics Relevant CWE: CWE-306 Missing Authentication for Critical Function CVSS Version Base Score Base Severity Vector String 3.1 7.5 HIGH CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N 4.0 8.7 HIGH CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N View CVE Details Acknowledgments Hitachi Energy Internal Team reported these vulnerabilities to CISA. Notice The information in this document is subject to change without notice and should not be construed as a commitment by Hitachi Energy. Hitachi Energy provides no warranty, express or implied, including warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose, for the information contained in this document, and assumes no responsibility for any errors that may appear in this document. In no event shall Hitachi Energy or any of its suppliers be liable for direct, indirect, special, incidental or consequential damages of any nature or kind arising from the use of this document, or from the use of any hardware or software described in this document, even if Hitachi Energy or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such damages. This document and parts hereof must not be reproduced or copied without written permission from Hitachi Energy and the contents hereof must not be imparted to a third party nor used for any unauthorized purpose. All rights to registrations and trademarks reside with their respective owners. Support For additional information and support please contact your product provider or Hitachi Energy service organization. For contact information, see https://www.hitachienergy.com/contact-us/ for Hitachi Energy contact-centers. General Mitigation Factors Recommended security practices and firewall configurations can help protect an industrial control system network from attacks that originate from outside the network. Such practices include that process control systems are physically protected from direct access by unauthorized personnel, have no direct connections to the Internet, and are separated from other networks by means of a firewall system that has a minimal number of ports exposed, and others that have to be evaluated case by case. Industrial control systems should not be used for Internet surfing, instant messaging, or receiving e-mails. Portable computers and removable storage media should be carefully scanned for viruses before they are connected to a control system. Additional information on Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity Best Practices can be found in the Hitachi Energy’s “Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity Best Practices” Cybersecurity Notification. [1] SSVC SSVCv2/E:N/A:N/2026-10-26T14:54:19Z/ Recommended Practices CISA recommends users take defensive measures to minimize the risk of exploitation of these vulnerabilities. Minimize network exposure for all control system devices and/or systems, ensuring they are not accessible from the internet. Locate control system networks and remote devices behind firewalls and isolating them from business networks. When remote access is required, use more secure methods, such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), recognizing VPNs may have vulnerabilities and should be updated to the most current version available. Also recognize VPN is only as secure as the connected devices. CISA reminds organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk assessment prior to deploying defensive measures. CISA also provides a section for control systems security recommended practices on the ICS webpage on cisa.gov/ics. Several CISA products detailing cyber defense best practices are available for reading and download, including Improving Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies. CISA encourages organizations to implement recommended cybersecurity strategies for proactive defense of ICS assets. Additional mitigation guidance and recommended practices are publicly available on the ICS webpage at cisa.gov/ics in the technical information paper, ICS-TIP-12-146-01B--Targeted Cyber Intrusion Detection and Mitigation Strategies. Organizations observing suspected malicious activity should follow established internal procedures and report findings to CISA for tracking and correlation against other incidents. Advisory Conversion Disclaimer This ICSA is a verbatim republication of Hitachi Energy PSIRT 8DBD000224 from a direct conversion of the vendor's Common Security Advisory Framework (CSAF) advisory. This is republished to CISA's website as a means of increasing visibility and is provided "as-is" for informational purposes only. CISA is not responsible for the editorial or technical accuracy of republished advisories and provides no warranties of any kind regarding any information contained within this advisory. Further, CISA does not endorse any commercial product or service. Please contact Hitachi Energy PSIRT directly for any questions regarding this advisory. Revision History Initial Release Date: 2026-10-27 Date Revision Summary 2026-10-27 1 Initial Public release 2026-10-29 2 Initial CISA Republication of Hitachi Energy PSIRT 8DBD000224 advisory Legal Notice and Terms of Use
The Hacker News
Cybersecurity researchers have disclosed details of an advanced persistent threat (APT) spear-phishing campaign that has targeted individuals affiliated with Taiwan research organizations to direct victims to an adversary-in-the-middle (AitM) phishing framework designed to harvest their Google account credentials and multi-factor authentication (MFA) codes. The activity is being tracked by
The Hacker News
Cybersecurity researchers have uncovered a large-scale, global recruitment-themed phishing campaign that uses fake interview scheduling pages and Browser-in-the-Browser (BitB) windows to steal Google and Facebook credentials and, in more advanced cases, relay multi-factor authentication (MFA) prompts in real time. CTM360, which detailed the activity in a new report titled RecruitTrap, said it
Dark Reading
The big-box giant has scaled its defenses by encouraging trust and innovation. Good communications, transparency and team spirit are key factors.
Dark Reading
Organizations are growing serious about what nation’s rules apply to their data. Experts point to geopolitical tensions as a main contributing factor.
The Register
UNC2814 historically targets governments and telcos A China-linked crew found a unique formula for attacking telcos and government orgs across the Americas, Asia, and Africa in its latest round of intrusions. Google's threat intelligence, along with unnamed industry partners, disrupted the gang, which used the Chocolate Factory's own spreadsheet tools as part of its exploits.…
The Hacker News
Most identity programs still prioritize work the way they prioritize IT tickets: by volume, loudness, or “what failed a control check.” That approach breaks the moment your environment stops being mostly-human and mostly-onboarded. In modern enterprises, identity risk is created by a compound of factors: control posture, hygiene, business context, and intent. Any one of these can perhaps be